부정청탁 및 금품 등 수수의 금지에 관한 법률(김영란법)의 효과와 한계에 대한 사회심리학적 접근

Since the “Improper Solicitation and Graft Act” has been implemented in September, 2016, the effectiveness of the law is still controversial. This research views corruption as a collective cooperation problem rather than the principal-agent problem. From the collective cooperation point of view, an individual’s behavior not to involved in corruption can be regarded as a cooperative behavior, while a corruptive behavior pursuing maximization of his/her own profits can be regarded as defection. We assume that the situation whether an individual participate in corruption or not is prisoner’s dilemmas game in which the dominant strategy is mutual defection. In this situation, most actors in the situation will participate in corruption if there is no structural or institutional change. Based on this, we argue that anti-corruption law can weaken actor’s motivation of corruptive behavior by a changing the reward structure of the game. That is, “Improper Solicitation and Graft Act” can change the game from the Prisoner’s dilemma game to the assurance game by decreasing the reward from one’s defective choice. More importantly, broad implementation of the law will enhance an individual’s expectation on other’s cooperation, in turn, makes conditional cooperator cooperate more. However, in addition to implementation of the law, it is necessary to enhance trust on the fairness of institutions, information on other’s behaviors to increase the effectiveness of the law.