기업지배구조가 배당스무딩에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구

Linter suggests that firms are more likely to adjust their dividend in response to a permanent change in earnings than to a temporary one. Using Beveridge-nelson method, we decompose the cash flow into permanent cash flow and transitory one by each firm, and focus on how dividend changes are affected by the transitory change of firm's cash flow. This paper empirically analysis the effect of corporate governance on its dividend smoothing policy, explicitly considering transitory change of firm's cash flow. We find that firms with poor governance tend to smooth dividend opportunistically. The firms with poor governance are more smooth dividend when the cash flow temporarily increases or less smooth dividend when cash flow temporarily decreases, as a result in less dividend smoothing behavior. These empirical results show how firms' dividend smoothing behavior associates with corporate governance, and that corporate governance improvement is necessary for stable dividends.