이해관계자 중심 기업지배구조가 자산손상 인식의 재량성에 미치는 영향

Valuation of fair value caused by K-IFRS(Korea International Financial Reporting Standards) more facilitates discretion and interpretation of executive through change to the principle-based standards. Past K-GAAP(Korea Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) was pointed out about problems with incomplete impairment regulation of asset. While the current K-IFRS provides specific guidance with respect to asset impairment loss, it is required to the judgment of executive in the accounting regulations such as the determination of the cash-generating unit and measuring recoverable amount. Due to the permitted discretion of executive in the accounting regulation, managers have a private incentive to take advantage of asset impairment loss, and are potentially able to abuse untested measuring recoverable amount. If the judgment of management is irresistibly applied to asset impairment decisions, firms need a device that can mitigate opportunistic behavior to monitor and supervise to private incentive of manager. Today's firms to be important on sustainability management and corporate social responsibility are emphasized on that corporate governance of the stakeholder must be established beyond corporate governance of the shareholder. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of stakeholder perspective corporate governance on the manager's simultaneous earnings management using asset impairment loss and discretionary accruals. The results of analyzing 1,264 samples of companies listed on the securities market between 2007 and 2013 are as follows. First, as a result of empirical analysis on the role of corporate governance for accounting transparency, it is found that the corporate governance structure based on the stakeholder alleviates the simultaneous earnings management of the manager's asset impairment recognition and discretionary accruals. Second, as a result of regression coefficient equivalence test and Vuong(1989)'s Z test, We find evidence that stakeholder perspective corporate governance reduces managerial earnings management more effectively than shareholder perspective corporate governance. The results of this study show that the management and supervision of the government and regulatory agencies will establish the corporate governance structure of internal and external stakeholder in the whole domestic enterprise through the establishment of corporate governance structure of employees and creditors as well as corporate internal governance. Suggesting that it should be urged. This study conducted additional analyzes that would provide additional evidence and add robustness to the results of the main analysis. The results of the empirical analysis of the simultaneous earnings management using the corporate governance rating of the Korean corporate governance structure shows that the firms with higher corporate governance rating are more likely to have the same asset impairment loss and discretionary accruals And low earnings management. The results of this study provide significant implication to manager, employees and all stakeholders of the company as well as outside investors. Firms get to build a positive corporate governance to enhance fiscal transparency for private incentive in pursuit of manager when recognize asset impairment loss. Therefore, this study expect that establishing good governance for accounting transparency and investor protection can be sufficient containment device to the executive pursuing private incentives.