K-IFRS하에서 경영자 재량에 의한 영업권 손상인식이 영업권 손상차손의 가치관련성에 미치는 영향

In this paper, we aim to analyze the effect of managerial discretion in determining goodwill impairment on the value relevance of goodwill impairment losses under K-IFRS. In Korea, firm managers are currently required to perform impairment test for acquired goodwill at least once a year rather than to amortize it over a specific period. The impairment-only approach mandated by IFRS is expected to provide more relevant and useful information on goodwill as well as impairment loss, whereby managerial private information about future performance can be conveyed to market participants. In contrast, prior literature document that managerial discretion allowed in the process of impairment test is likely to be exercised for opportunistic purposes, such as earnings management. This paper investigates whether goodwill impairment recognition is related to the managerial incentives such as big-bath or income smoothing under K-IFRS, and whether the discretionally recognized impairment losses convey differential information content relative to control group. Using 1,355 firm-year observations from domestic listed companies over 2011 through 2016, we find that goodwill impairment recognition is positively associated with income smoothing incentive. Furthermore, we observe that the value relevance of impairment losses associated with income smoothing incentive significantly deteriorates. The results support that managers exercise their discretion in determining goodwill impairment for opportunistic purpose, which, in turn, aggravates the information content of impairment losses rather than conveying private information under K-IFRS.