자진신고 제도의 주요 쟁점과 정책적 시사점

This paper provides policy implications as well as an analysis of various aspects of the leniency policy. It is generally accepted that there are three essential cornerstones to successfully implement a leniency program: (i) High risk of detection and serious sanctions being imposed; (ii) Sanctions imposed are significant; and (iii) Transparency and certainty. However, in practice, it is very difficult for competition authorities to meet the prerequisites. There may be concerns about the retributive injustice of an antitrust offender who applies for leniency. Currently, it identifies that there are some challenges for successful leniency: availability of evidence; difficulty in detecting international cartels; and atypical cartels. Then it reviews various aspects of Korean leniency program with counterparts of EU and the US. First, it discusses issues related to leniency for subsequent applicants. Second, it reviews the qualifications. While in EU and Korea, participants who coerced others to join the cartel will not qualify for immunity, the corporation was not the leader or originator in the United States. However, in practice, they have similar qualifications. Korea makes it clear that recidivists are not allowed to receive leniency for a certain period while EU grants leniency. Third, it examines a particular feature of a leniency program called a “marker”. Marker systems have been introduced in EU and the U.S. while Korea has not adopted the system yet. Amnesty plus was developed in the US while it was introduced in Korea recently. This paper discusses theoretical justifications and limits for Amnesty plus. Also it examines the possibility of strategic use of leniency by cartelists. Finally it reviews the relationship leniency, criminal sanctions and antitrust damages actions.