프랑스의 기업파산 절차에서 경영자의 법적 책임에 관한 고찰

A bankruptcy liability of entrepreneur in French can be assessed as a special procedural liability resulting from acts that lead to a lack of active assets of the company, or by the interruption of bankruptcy proceedings. It is distinguished from general accountability for reasons such as having special handling of the procedure and strong credibility of the creditor’s interests. It is the main purpose of imposing property liability to managers and ensuring the recovery of creditors’ collection of her claims, and at the same time it is expected to be a disciplinary function to penalize official sanctions and criminal sanctions against executives who have performed specific acts. It also leads to the issue of the manager’s guarantor in practice in Korean legal system. These days, French Act No. 2005-845, enacted on July 26, 2005, provides more flexible provisions for manager’s guarantor so as not to inhibit the application of creditor oriented bankruptcy procedures. In this respect, the French executive bankruptcy liability law is making interesting progress. Under French law, liability for insolvency is a special responsibility of the directors in the bankruptcy law. However, many revisions were made before the French Commercial Law over the following centuries. The structure of the manager’s bankruptcy liabilities has also changed, but specific issues such as the unique theories, structure, and evaluation criteria are not fully introduced in Korea. Therefore, in this article, the history of revision of bankruptcy law in France will be clarified, and the structure and operation status of bankruptcy liability of executives of current law will be reviewed and verified. In this paper, I examine the liabilities of managers in the French bankruptcy law in the following order. In Chapter 2, I briefly introduced the history of the French bankruptcy law and I explained the history of the law revision focusing on the managerial liability system at the time of default. In Chapter 3, I examine the liability of the property owner in the bankruptcy responsibilities of the current law. In Chapter 4, I explain the job responsibilities among the managers’ bankruptcy liabilities. In Chapter 5, I studied criminal liability during the manager’s bankruptcy responsibilities. In this way, the CEO’s bankruptcy liabilities are divided into three responsibilities. In chapter 6, implications are presented as conclusions.