조세회피와 경영자의 사적이익 추구

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the complementary relationship between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction proposed by Desai and Dharmapala(2006) works in case of our country. After Desai and Dharmapala’s study, several study were conducted for agency-view of tax avoidance briskly. Otherwise, Blaylock(2015), Sedman and Stomberg(2013), Gallemore et al.(2014) and Armstrong et al.(2015) have shown conflicting results. In particular, Blaylock’s study(2015) for in U.S. firms proposed that factors have no significant relationships between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction directly. However, this study has anticipated that it may have complementary relationship because our country have more opaque environment for accounting and weak corporate governance than U.S.’s. Furthermore, corporate governance and information environment may have effect on relationship between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction as the conditional effect. According to analysis results for this study, an increase of overinvestment, decrease of future performance and shareholder payouts has occurred for firms of tax avoidance. It show that relationship between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction have complementary relationship. While this results correspond to study by Desai and Dharmapala(2006), it has apparently contradictory result with study by Blaylock(2015), which indicated that their have no significant relationships. The relationship between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction was strengthened when it has weak corporate governance and opaque information environment.