경영자가 영업이익예측치에 부합하려는 유인

Managers can alleviate information asymmetry between corporate and stakeholder by disclosing operating earnings forecasts. However, it is expected that managers make real operating earnings meet or beat their earnings forecasts through executing their ability to exercise accounting discretion in order to maximize their compensation. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to pave the way to complement the possibility that the original intent of fair disclosure will be impaired by revealing on managerial incentives to meet or beat their operating earnings forecasts. The results are summarized as follows. The results show that earnings management is positively associated with management earnings forecast accuracy, with this association strengthened positively as managerial ownership increases. Furthermore, the positive effect of the interaction between earnings management and managerial ownership on management earnings forecast accuracy is strengthened in firms that paid higher compensation to managers. The interaction between managerial ownership and highly－paid compensation also is positively associated with beating earnings forecast through earnings management practices. Consequently, it seems that managers seek to meet or beat operating earnings forecasts with the tool of earnings management and their influence on management in order to attain their private incentive of compensation maximization.