주주의 지분율 변화에 따른 위험회피도가경영자 보상계약에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]This study investigates how the noise of performance measure and shareholder ownership structure affect the weight in determining executive compensation. [Methodology]This study theoretically analyzes whether the informativeness of performance measure affects the weight in determining executive compensation, and whether shareholder’s risk aversion for the change of shareholder’s ownership affects the weight in determining executive compensation. And this study empirically investigates the effect of the noise of performance measure and shareholder ownership structure affect the weight in determining executive compensation. [Findings]Using the cash compensation data(salary plus annual bonus) from 2011 to 2016 and final sample is 2,785 firm－year listed in KOSPI. We find that the noise of the performance measure is negatively associated with the compensation weight of executive performance measures. This is because the informativeness of the agent’s effort level decreases as the noise of the performance measure increases in the executive compensation contract. We also find that principal’s risk premium is significantly and positively associated with the compensation weight of executive performance measures. This finding is that the principal becomes more risk averse due to the increase of the principal’s ownership, he would like to impose more risks the agent for a better risk sharing. In addition, it is confirmed that the risk sharing is more emphasized in the executive compensation contract when the separation of ownership and management is controlled. [Implications]This study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by providing evidence that compensation contracts are properly designed.