기관투자자의 특성과 감사보수와의 관계 : 외부대규모기관투자자 및 투자기간을 중심으로

We examine the relationship between institutional investors’ characteristics and audit fees. The characteristics of institutional investors are defined as institutional investors as outside block-holders and long investment horizons which have the incentive to independently monitor the firm’s CEO. In addition, we investigate whether the effect of institutional investors as outside block shareholders on audit fees is more powerful in the companies with long investment horizons of institutional investors than in firms without them. Using a comprehensive sample of 5,308 non-financial firm-year data listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2014. We find that institutional investors as outside block shareholders and long investment horizons have respectively a positive relation to the audit fees. Moreover, the effect of institutional investors as outside block shareholders on audit fees is more powerful in the companies with long investment horizons of institutional investors than in firms without them. While existing studies consider a institutional investor just a monitoring entity as a whole, this study classifies institutional investors into independent block shareholders and investment horizon, and subsequently analyzes each of their impacts on audit fees. In this respect, this study offers Korean policy makers in developing the opportunities to build effective corporate governance system using the characteristics of institutional investors.