기업의 조세회피와 경영자의 횡령 및 배임과의 관련성

This paper conducts an empirical study on the correlation between tax avoidance and managers' misconduct such as embezzlement and malpractice. Our study also confirms the correlation between them taking into account whether firms are owner-controlled or management-controlled. To be specific, the occurrence of tax avoidance and the managers' misconduct indicates that there is a high probability of two problems, the agency problem and the malfunction of internal and external monitoring and control system. Also, both actions are for manager's personal interests and will have a positive correlation. By contrast, if both actions occur at the same time, the risk of being caught by the tax authorities increases and managers will not commit them at the same time, so both actions have a negative correlation. Additionally, there will be differences in the correlation between tax avoidance and managers' misconduct due to managers' propensity according to the characteristics of whether firms are owner-controlled or management-controlled. In other words, the results will vary due to the actual control of the boards and the audit committee and the level of the monitoring and control system. This study uses samples composed of the firms which have closed their accounts in December among listed/delisted on KOSPI market and KOSDAQ market of KRX from 2006 to 2015. We could use panel data to estimate LPM(Liner Probability Model) but chose panel logit random effects model to control uncertainty of estimates for dependent variables, heteroskedasticity and endogenous. The empirical results are as follows. First, tax avoidance and the manager's misconduct have a negative correlation. The probability of both actions occurring at the same time is significantly lower because it can increase manager's burden of risks to be punished by tax investigation. Second, we analyze how owners' participation in management affects the manager's misconduct and confirm that they have a negative correlation. In the case of management-controlled firms, managers tend to avoid risks that can damage their interests such as term-extension, compensation, and salary negotiation. In this study, we conduct empirical analysis using various tax avoidance measures(4 ETRs, 3 BTDs) and obtain generalizable results. It is significant in that our research considers the characteristics of whether a firm is owner-controlled or management-controlled and deals with the embezzlement and malpractice that constantly occurs in Korea.