대규모기업집단, 최고경영자의 영향력, 그리고 최고경영자의 미등기임원 전환 : 개별 임원보수 공시를 중심으로

As part of efforts to improve the transparency of executive compensation, the Korean government requires firms to disclose executives’ pay information in the annual report starting 2013 fiscal year if executives receive compensation more than 500 million won a year. In this study, we examine whether chaebol firms which are affiliated with large business group is switched from Chief Executive Officer (hereafter, CEO) to non-director officer, and whether CEO power affects the switch of CEO to non-director officer. Using executives’ pay information which is publicly disclosed in Korea, we find that chaebol firms do not have a significant association with the switch from CEO to non-director officer. This is because of the mixed implications that chaebol firms comply disclosure obligation to avoid potential legal and political issues and their family members of chaebol firms are already switched from CEO to non-director officer to reduce firms’ political costs. On the other hand, Co-CEO structure and the separation of CEO and board chair are significantly negative association with the switch from CEO to non-director officer. Lastly, internally promoted CEO is more likely to be switched from CEO to non-director officer. Taken together, the results suggest that powerful CEOs are more likely to avoid executives’ pay disclosure requirement. Our study provides the determinants of the switch of CEO to non-director officer after disclosing individual executives’ compensation. We also provide practical implications for regulators that they should provide more differentiated oversight on corporate governance because the switch of CEO to non-director officer could be influenced by corporate governance such as chaebol firms and CEO characteristic.