K－IFRS의 도입과 경영자의 성과－보상 민감도

[Purpose] The purpose of this study is to examine how the introduction of K－IFRS influences the sensitivity of corporate accounting performance to executive compensation. Further, this paper analyzes whether the board of directors evaluates the performance of an executive based on the performance measures in consolidated financial statements or financial performance measures in separate financial statements when a parent company designs an compensation contract under the K－IFRS. [Methodology] This study empirically analyzes corporate accounting performance－manager compensation sensitivity under K－IFRS for listed manufacturing industries from 2004 to 2017. [Findings] First, the performance－reward sensitivity has increased significantly after the application of K－IFRS more than before it was applied. Second, the performance indicators－compensation sensitivity of the separate financial statements is higher than the performance indicators－compensation sensitivity of the consolidated financial statements. However, the consolidated performance indicators have an incremental compensation sensitivity. [Implications] This study is meaningful for helping various stakeholders of company to understand the positive effect of K－IFRS more clearly by verifying the relationship between K－IFRS applied accounting performance indicators and manager compensation.