특수관계자 거래가 이익조정에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]This study examines the relationship between the transactions to related party and earnings management. In addition, this study tests if the relationship is different between large and non－large enterprise group, and before and after the years of the regulations act. [Methodology]The sample consists of 1,558 firm－years with the transactions to related party listed in Korea Exchange from fiscal year 2002 to 2017. All required data are obtained via TS2000. The discretionary accrual used as a proxy of earnings management is estimated using the model designed by Paek and Cho(2006). The amount of related party transactions is measured as the sum of the transactions to related party disclosed in annual report. The large enterprise group is taken as dummy variables. It is coded as one if the sample satisfies the required conditions that the fair trade act defines, and as zero otherwise. The regulation act of related party transaction is taken as dummy variable. It is coded as one if the observation is taken from the fiscal year 2002～2011, and as zero otherwise. [Findings]The empirical results are as follows. First, I find a statistically significant relationship between the related party transactions and earnings management. Second, there is a significantly negative relationship between the transactions to related party and earnings management in large enterprise group. Third, no differences were found between before and after the years of the regulations act. [Implications]The findings imply that managers use the related party transaction as the way of earnings management and that regulations such as fair trade law mitigate earnings management in large enterprise group.