The Relationship between Manager Type and Carbon Intensity and the Impact of Information Asymmetry and Disclosure

This study empirically investigates the relationship between a firm’s manager type and its carbon intensity and examines the effects of information asymmetry and carbon disclosure on this relationship. The findings are as follows. First, in excessive energy-consuming industries, the carbon intensity of a firm having a professional manager is higher than that of an owner-manager firm. It is inferred that a professional manager is passive toward energy-efficiency investments in reducing carbon emissions because of the risks to his or her compensation and job security based on short-term performance evaluations. Second, the high information asymmetry of such a firm further increases the positive relation between the existence of a professional manager and its carbon intensity. This finding implies that when the information asymmetry between a manager and mandator in such a firm is high, a professional manager can better hide the lack of investment in reducing carbon emissions; thus, a firm has higher carbon intensity. Third, a professional manager’s shareholding does not impact carbon intensity. Finally, when a professional manager firm voluntarily discloses its carbon information, the increase of its carbon intensity is alleviated. The study is the first to confirm the relation between a firm’s manager type and its carbon intensity. The results of this study contribute to confirming that a firm’s manager type is a factor affecting its carbon intensity, which has important implications for managers and investors.