기업지배구조가 경제적 부가가치에 미치는 영향-기업지배구조 지수, 제품시장경쟁도, 노동조합

The purpose of this study empirically analyses the effects of corporate governance on economic value added(EVA) using the sample of Korea manufacturing firm listed on the Korea Exchange(KRX) from 2005 to 2012. Based on extends the studies of Coles et al.(2001), Giroud and Mueller(2011) by examining the effects of corporate governance on EVA. Major findings are as follows. First, internal corporate governance, such as a board of directors, positively affects EVA. However, the interaction between internal corporate governance and a labor union has statistically negative affects on EVA. Besides, an interaction among internal corporate governance, product market competition, and labor union has negative affects on EVA. These results show that internal corporate governance can be an effective mechanism to handle agency problems between shareholders and managers. The results also prove an English proverb “Too many cooks spoil the broth,” in that various control mechanism working altogether may put too much pressure on managers, resulting in poor performance. This study differentiates itself from previous literature. Unlike most previous studies with one-dimensional approach, this study investigates interaction among various corporate governance mechanisms. Overall results have a few important economic and social implications. Because internal corporate governance works as an effective mechanism to mitigate agency problems in every model, policymakers should find ways to make internal control mechanisms, such as a board of directors, as independent as possible. As far as labor union is concerned, when other control mechanisms are not doing their jobs of handling agency problems, it needs to intervene in decision made by top level executives.