신용등급 개선을 위한 국민연금의 주주행동주의에 대한 고찰

[Purpose]Interest in the shareholder activism of national pension fund has recently been expanded, including the introduction of stewardship codes. If the national pension fund exercises independent voting rights for shareholders, agency costs are expected to decrease. Thus, the firm’s accounting transparency increase, positively affecting corporate value and credit ratings. Therefore, we examine whether the existence of national pension blockholders enhances corporate bond ratings. [Methodology]National pension blockholders that hold at least a 5% equity are classified as short－term(less than 1 year) and long－term(more than 3 years). The credit ratings of the corporate bond is used by the data disclosed by domestic credit rating agencies. By using the variables derived in this way, we analyze the 1,805 samples listed in KOSPI from 2006 to 2016 by using the ordered logit model and the ordered probit model. [Findings]Our finding supports the premise that credit rating adjustment are positively associated with the existence of national pension blockholders that own at least 5% ownership in the firm. However, this is due to the effect of the long－term blockholders, not the short－term. Taken together, our evidence suggests that the existence of national pension blockholders seems to be better corporate bond ratings, providing more constraining managerial opportunistic behavior. [Implications]This study sheds new light on the role of the national pension fund as a shareholder from the viewpoint of corporate governance among various factors affecting corporate bond ratings. In particular, it provides an opportunity to recognize the importance of the investment period by suggesting that the roles of blockholders in the short and long term are differentiated in corporate bond ratings. This can be used as a meaningful argument for the detailed policy composition and revision of the stewardship code to expand the positive role of the national pension fund.