통합도산법의 기존 관리인 유지제도가 구조조정 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향

In this paper, the purpose is to analyze the effect of the Debtor in Possession(DIP) system of The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act(Unified Insolvency Law) which was enforced in April 2006 adopts applied to external audit companies from 1990 to 2016 on the management performance of restructuring firms. Specifically, this study examines the relationship between financial performance(quantitative management performance) and qualitative management performance, which are caused by the effects of restructuring, on sales, gross profit, operating income, net income. This study uses the substitution variable of discretionary accruals and real earnings management to analyze the effect of the DIP of the unified insolvency law on the management performance of the restructuring company. In addition, to examine the effect of the DIP, the results of the post-restructuring period between the period of applying the unified insolvency law and the period of the previous corporate restructuring law are examined by difference-in-difference analysis. The main results are as follows. Overall, the application of the DIP significantly increased the net income of quantitative management performance and discretionary accrual which is qualitative management performance as compared to the managerial appointment of the third - party manager. This implies that the improvement in financial performance due to the restructuring is derived from the net income attributable to the accruals rather than the increase in sales and operating profit. Second, restructuring of DIP reduces qualitative management performance through real earnings management. A company of the DIP can report an improvement in its financial performance, but it has been found that the risk of facing corporate bankruptcy is higher after restructuring because qualitative management performance of managers with private incentives is lowered. Third, the existing managerial maintenance system has lowered the qualitative management performance in the unlisted company as opposed to the listed company. This suggests that if an existing manager is elected as a manager, the existing management can abuse it for private gain in the process of liquidation of the company rather than the corporate recovery due to the nature of the privately held company. This study has the following implications and limitations. First, this study empirically analyzed the problems of the DIP which has been continuously pointed out by the precedent study related to the law. As a result, it can serve as evidence for the amendment of the legal provisions for the appointment of managers in the unified insolvency law. Second, the previous studies on restructuring of existing accounting studies were conducted only on listed companies, but this study included all firms subject to external audit. At present, the improvement of corporate governance in listed companies in Korea is much improved compared to the situation in the previous financial crisis. However, since companies such as external audit companies are small size and managed by founders, they are not operating as professional managers. For small businesses, strict legal application is also needed for the appointment of managers at the time of restructuring court restructuring for corporate restructuring. Therefore, we expect that the results of this study will help the recovery of SMEs such as listed companies as well as external audit companies. On the other hand, this study can not be applied to the analysis because of the constraints on the sample because most of the companies except the small number of companies adopting the unified insolvency law appoint the manager as the existing management, also it is difficult to distinguish between the third - party manager and an existing manager.