애스크로AIPublic Preview
← 학술논문 검색
학술논문법학연구2018.12 발행

트럼프 시대에서의 WTO 및 한-미FTA 패널판정의 이행 및 보복제도 대응방안

Implementation of WTO and Korea-US FTA Panel Decisions and Retaliation in the Era of Trumpism

최원목(이화여자대학교)

29권 2호, 499~526쪽

초록

The United States, the leading country of the WTO system, has become a representative state that refuses to implement WTO Panel decisions. Donald Trump Administration of the U.S. in particular declares that it will not implement any WTO decisions that restrict US sovereignty. Given this trend, the Korean government needs to strategically prepare for any possible situation of US non-implementation of WTO or FTA panel decisions against Korea. This strategy should include such considerations and issues as the reasonable period of implementation, request of compliance panel procedures, and degree and scope of retaliation. If the US non-implementation is reasonably anticipated and when monetary compensation is acceptable solution to Korea, the Korean government may actively use the monetary assessment mechanism of dispute panel procedure under the Korea-US FTA. This option will reduce the burden of Korea in taking retaliation against the United States. There may arise a situation where taking retaliation against America is not desirable for Korean economy or diplomacy. In this situation, Korea may choose to refuse to implement another WTO panel decision in which Korea has been defeated by the U.S. and using this non-implementation as a leverage, the Korean government may strategically manage the mutual non- implementation situations with the United States.

Abstract

The United States, the leading country of the WTO system, has become a representative state that refuses to implement WTO Panel decisions. Donald Trump Administration of the U.S. in particular declares that it will not implement any WTO decisions that restrict US sovereignty. Given this trend, the Korean government needs to strategically prepare for any possible situation of US non-implementation of WTO or FTA panel decisions against Korea. This strategy should include such considerations and issues as the reasonable period of implementation, request of compliance panel procedures, and degree and scope of retaliation. If the US non-implementation is reasonably anticipated and when monetary compensation is acceptable solution to Korea, the Korean government may actively use the monetary assessment mechanism of dispute panel procedure under the Korea-US FTA. This option will reduce the burden of Korea in taking retaliation against the United States. There may arise a situation where taking retaliation against America is not desirable for Korean economy or diplomacy. In this situation, Korea may choose to refuse to implement another WTO panel decision in which Korea has been defeated by the U.S. and using this non-implementation as a leverage, the Korean government may strategically manage the mutual non- implementation situations with the United States.

발행기관:
법학연구소
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.34267/cblj.2018.29.2.499
분류:
법학

AI 법률 상담

이 논문의 주제에 대해 더 알고 싶으신가요?

460만+ 법률 자료에서 관련 판례·법령·해석례를 찾아 답변합니다

AI 상담 시작
트럼프 시대에서의 WTO 및 한-미FTA 패널판정의 이행 및 보복제도 대응방안 | 법학연구 2018 | AskLaw | 애스크로 AI