국제 핵 비확산 체제의 맹점 및 개선방안 - 이란 및 북한의 경험을 중심으로

The nuclear issue of North Korea and Iran is drawing anew the attention of the international community. In addition to a diplomatic game surrounding North Korea's nuclear problem, the United States has announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and the reinstatement of the sanction regime on Iran. North Korea and Iran have posed a serious challenge to the NPT regime from a different perspective. NPT regime includes an extensive rules, principles and regimes related to the NPT as well as the NPT itself which is based on the three pillars: no-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. The Iranian nuclear problem which began with a disclosure of clandestine nuclear facilities by an anti-government group in August 2002, seemed to settle down with the conclusion of the JCPOA. However, it faces a new phase with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA could not have got rid of all the concerns about Iranian nuclear program as it allowed the enrichment of uranium even though its volume has been scaled down. Furthermore, most of the restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel expires in 15 years. North Korean nuclear problem has surfaced in 1993 with its refusal of the IAEA special inspection, which was followed by North Korea's declaration to withdraw from the NPT. Having reneged on its promise to denuclearization made under the 1994 Agreed Framework or September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, North Korea has conducted nuclear test as many as six times. While North Korea has conducted nuclear test six times after the withdrawal from the NPT, Iran tried to enrich uranium on the pretext of a legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear problem clearly showed the loopholes inherent in the NPT regime. In order to plug up the loopholes, it is recommended to take the following measures: First, nuclear-weapon states should provide non-nuclear-weapon states with the NSA(Negative Security Assurance) and the PSA(Positive Security Assurance) in the form of international treaties. Second, It is worth taking into serious account the prohibition of all nuclear-related trade with the NPT outliers, including trade in nuclear-related technology, equipments and facilities and financing of nuclear-related project. Third, the verification system including safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation should be strengthened. Fourth, It is necessary to reinforce the export control system and to further develop the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative). Fifth, it is necessary to strengthen international control on nuclear fuel and to take into consideration the establishment of universal IAEA-administered LEU Bank. Sixth, stricter and heavier sanctions should be imposed on the violation of the NPT or its safeguards agreement. Seventh, the conditions and procedures of the withdrawal from the NPT should be strictly enforced. The withdrawal should be interpreted as a “threat to the peace” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as long as the withdrawing state does not prove itself to the contrary. Eighth, the nuclear-weapon states should implement nuclear disarmament faithfully by taking the 13 practical steps which were adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. As a way to implement above-proposals, it is recommended to adopt a new Protocol to the NPT.