토마스 아퀴나스에서 양심과 아리스토텔레스적 실천이성의 관계

According to Thomas Aquinas, conscience is the act of applying knowledge to a specific action. However, according to the Aristotelian concept, such an act is the proper function of practical reason. If this is the case, in what relationship are they? This question may be expressed in a different way: How did Aquinas unify the non-Aristotelian concept of conscience and Aristotelian practical reason? Although some scholars accept that conscience is bound up with practical reason, they think that judgements of conscience are separate from judgements of practical reason. However, others are skeptical that Aquinas’ definition of conscience has a special, proper function that practical reason does not comprise. This paper will show that Aquinas synthesized the two different concepts in this manner. He integrated the non-Aristotelian concept of conscience into the Aristotelean concept of practical reason. The functions of conscience correspond to some functions of practical reason, but practical reason has additional functions (for example to order). In addition, it cannot be assumed that conscience complies with practical wisdom. The fallibility of conscience makes a fundamental difference in practical wisdom, and unlike the conscience, practical wisdom is a dianoetic virtue warranting to take place a real action. Therefore, Aquinas neither distorts the ethics of Aristotle through the term “conscience,” nor does he perfect it by filling gaps in Aristotelian ethics. Of course Aquinas’s conscience does not function as an internal (God-given) judge.