디지털 경제에서 알고리즘 담합에 관한 연구

The development of the digital economy brings the issue of algorithmic collusion from a competition law perspective. A use of algorithms increases the transparency and the efficiency in the market but it makes collusion easier. Specifically, algorithms enhances the possibility of the collusion through the automated exchange of information, monitoring and adjustment and it makes it difficult for potential competitors to enter the marketplace. We suggest two scenarios for the antitrust law’s application to the algorithmic collusion. Firstly, the scenario is the algorithmic collusion which human is involved. Secondly, the scenario is the algorithmic collusion which human is not involved. Topkins case, Uber case, and Trod case, Eturas case, and the recent European Commission’s investigation on the resale price maintenance are all involved in human’s collusion and these cases had been reviewed by the traditional competition laws. However, a new approach on the algorithmic collusion which human is not involved is required under the assumption of the development of technology. The prior measures to protect the competition will be the practical alternative to such algorithmic collusion. Also, in case the scope of algorithmic collusion may be beyond our expectations and human is not involved in such algorithmic collusion we need to consider the conscious parallelism and quasi-concerted practices. The conscious parallelism and quasi-concerted practices themselves are not illegal and they should be reviewed with the plus factors and still the antitrust liability should be attributed to the undertakings. Such plus factors may be the undertaking’s awareness that the algorithms will facilitate collusion and undertaking’s intention that it will accept the collusion without rejection and such plus factors will include the fact that the programmers did not take any prior preventive measures.