신규상장기업의 상장 직후 감사인변경과 실제 이익조정

This study analyzed the significant differences of the Real Earnings Management(REM) between designated auditor_change and designated auditor_unchange of post－IPO. In the case that the auditor can be freely selected after listing, the incentive to select an external auditor who is favorable to accounting policies or accounting standards in accordance with profit adjustment is high, replacement auditor is likely to have a lower level of information about management than the auditor who has continued to audit. Therefore, a firm that has replaced the designated auditor for the manager's favorable financial reporting may have a significant difference in Real Earnings Management(REM) than the comparator firm. Empirical results, as expected, Real Earnings Management(REM) of auditor－changed firms is significantly higher than that of auditor－unchanged firms in the post－IPO year. These results are consistent with the integration of real earnings management. It is expected that managerial choice of designated auditor replacement will be a preliminary signal to Real Earnings Management(REM), which is known to damage corporate value in the long run. This study can be used as a reference for establishing the policy of the supervisory authorities and enhancing the efficiency of the system in relation to the designation system of auditors of newly listed companies.