미래 고객 중요성과 감사위원회가 감사품질에 미치는 영향

Prior studies on audit quality have overlooked that the clients’ future economic importance may be an incentive for auditors to compromise their independence. They have also not verified whether this possibility is controlled by the audit committee, which is responsible for oversight of managers and external audit. The purpose of this study is to verify whether audit committees can control the relationship between audit quality and clients’ future economic importance. The results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the clients’future economic (audit fees, total fees) and earnings management, whereas a negative relationship between the audit committee complying with best practices and earnings management. However, the positive relationship between the clients’ future economic importance and earnings management is not controlled by the audit committee following all best practices. These results suggest that the audit committee does not recognize the increase in future economic importance as an cause for the impairment of auditor independence or that the economic bonding between the manager and the auditor is stronger than audit committee effectiveness. This study suggests that policy measures should be taken to improve the effectiveness of the surveillance mechanism to check the possibility of impairing auditor independence due to the clients’ future economic importance.