Agency Problem and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Firms with Preferred Stock in Korea

[Purpose]The separation of ownership and control has been recognized as the source of the agency problem between managers and shareholders. There is relatively little attention firms with alternative ownership schemes such as preferred stocks in Korea. We expect that firms with preferred stock may create a unique agency problem. [Methodology]We examine the association between tax avoidance and dual－class structure using OLS Regression. We use non－financial firms traded in KOSPI during 2002－2017. [Findings]We find that insider control rights－cash flow rights divergence caused by preferred stock leads to a lower shareholder value by reducing the level of tax avoidance before the global financial crisis. The level of tax avoidance and the presence of preferred stock disappears after the crisis. The results suggest that agency conflict is reduced after the crisis. [Implication]This study shed lights to understand the role of preferred stocks in emerging market countries, and shows the potential risk of dual class stocks from perspective of agency theory. In addition, this study suggests that the complex structure of Korean chaebol also affect the tendency of tax avoidance.