대주주의 주식담보대출이 기업 배당정책에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

Typically is security backed loans considered a way for individual investors to utilize one’s assets. However, recent studies reveal that agency problem is resulted from large shareholders’ security backed loans. This study analyzes how the agency problem caused by security backed loans affects dividend policies of domestic public companies in Korea. Empirical study confirms the following: first, negative response in share prices is observed on and around the disclosure date when a large shareholder of a public company takes on individual loan backed by its securities. Second, a large shareholder’s taking on security backed loan is usually followed by the company’s decision to raise dividend, which is consistently observed throughout additional analyses such as subsampling and difference-in-difference analysis. Third, the more its dividend rises, the relatively less likely its margin call comes for the companies whose securities are offered as mortgage. Combining theories suggested by existing research papers, these outcomes can be read as follow: discrepancy between ownership and control is widened when a large shareholder takes on the security backed loan as the title of the securities are transferred to a lending facility, while the large shareholder still holds onto control over the company. The discrepancy exacerbates the agency problem, which is reflected upon the negative reaction in share prices. The drop in share prices brought by the agency problem not only reduces the wealth of the individual shareholder but also raises the concerns about margin call. The large shareholder, thus, asks for more dividends from the company in a bid to alleviate the looming agency problem, and an official from the firm amends its dividend policy considering his/her control over the company.