기업의 기부금 결정요인과 기업가치

The motivation and impact of corporate giving has long been a topic of interest in academic literature. Studies in this field have largely offered two interpretations of this phenomenon. According to the investment view, corporate giving is considered an investment strategy that creates value for the firm. According to the cost view, however, corporate giving is considered a discretionary expense on the part of the manager, which indicates that corporate giving can give rise to an agency problem that will either add nothing to a firm’s value or ultimately harm it. This study examines this question of whether corporate giving adds to firm value. For corporate giving to add value, the agency problem must be minimized not only by giving at the right time but also by giving the appropriate amount, as over-giving can lead to an agency problem. This paper proceeds as follows. First, the relationship between the manager’s share ratio and the donation is examined to see whether an agency problem exists. Cases in which a manager with relatively meager financial resources makes a considerable donation are considered to be indicative of an agency problem. According to our results, managers with a low stakeholder ratio who make considerable donations are considered to be doing so for personal gain. Second, regression coefficients are found even in the analysis of the impact of the donations on firm value, which was calculated using instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. Cases in which managers used their discretion to make donations that ultimately decreased the value of the firm are considered to represent an agency problem. Third, in cases in which the largest stockholders were the CEOs, lower largest stockholder ownership was shown to be associated with a noticeable growth in corporate giving. Owning managers were more likely to use expenses discretionally than were executive managers. And in the analysis of the governance structure for the manager’s donation, no significant connection was found with either the board of directors or institutional investors. Foreign shareholders also showed a tendency to regulate donations. The results of this analysis show a need for the improvement of both internal and external disciplinary systems. Fourth, we analyzed over-giving. Cases in which firms donated more than their competitors were found to have a negative impact on firm value, thus magnifying the agency problem. Although some firms with high firm value may wish to enhance their social roles, the notion that corporate giving can be a strategy to raise firm value was not supported. This study provides empirical data for the discussion regarding whether corporate giving should be seen as an investment or an agency cost and shows that internal and external controls are necessary in the culture of corporate giving.