정치도덕에 대한 드워킨의 해석적 접근법

There is one of the most popular beliefs of our time in politics, economics, and culture, it is probably pluralism. The most important moral problem it creates in our lives is an belief that no moral truth without difference of positions. Philosophers think this as an indeterminability to establish a moral imperative, but Ronald Dworkin sees this as the need for an independent approach to explore and justify moral truth. Because moral judgment always works in politics, and unless the moral principles underlying our actions or our voting in politics are founded on truth, there is no justification for it, not on its authority, but on its own responsibility. Ultimately, to have or defend a particular point of view in relation to political morality, one must prove that one's principles of morality and its premises are justifiable. Dworkin says the political ideal of equality today is threatened with extinction. Historically, the socialist egalitarian ignored the citizens own light to pursue their interests. The conservative libertarianism also ignored the collective responsibility of the political community. In Dworkin's view, however, both accusations are mistakes. Because it is possible to have one unified explanation for equality and responsibility which respect both equality and liberty. Dworkin suggests the principle of equal concern and the principle of special responsibility to explain his integration theory. First of all, the principle of equal concern requires people to act in an equal consideration for a group of people. And the principle of special responsibility admits citizens right to their own life. These two principles are correlated, and the principle of special responsibility can be justified by the principle of equal concern. That is why Dworkin proposes equal concern as the sovereign virtue of the political community. According to Dworkin, equality and liberty the basic values of political morality, are interpretative concepts. So political morality is an interpretative scheme itself, as the concepts of political morality are interpretative concepts that can not be explained other than through normative logic. All political morality are always interpretative concepts, and the proper use of these concepts is a matter of interpretation. Therefore, determining which of the different views about equality or liberty is right or wrong is an logical work, and this reveals that individuals freedom is associated with communal equality. In this context, Dworkin proposes equality and liberty as the integrative value in political morality. Moral skepticism claims that there is no answer to the question of what best contributes to our collective life, but it is an interpretation of politics itself. Although it may seem unlikely that the principles of integrating values in political morality are established, what is left to us is only uncertainty, not nihilism.