기업의 사회적 책임과 회계성과에 대한 지배주주의 조절효과

Previous studies on corporate social responsibility have focused only on the relationship between social responsibility performance and corporate performance, but have overlooked that this relationship is linked to the dynamics of stakeholders related to agency issues within the firm. This study aims to verify how the relationship between corporate social responsibility performance and accounting performance can be determined by the controlling shareholder's intention. This study confirms the intention of the controlling shareholder in the business management through the non-linear relationship between controlling shareholders’ holdings and accounting performance. The controlling shareholders supported the hypothesis of the expropriation of external minority shareholders at low or high stakes, but supported the hypothesis of the convergence of managerial interests in the middle section. The positive relationship between corporate social responsibility performance and accounting performance is weakened as the stake of controlling shareholder increases in the section that supports the hypothesis of the expropriation of minority shareholders. On the other hand, this relation is strengthened as the stake increases in the section where the hypothesis of the convergence of managerial interests is supported. These results show that the relationship between corporate social responsibility performance and accounting performance depends on the intention of the controlling shareholder to engage in corporate management. This study suggests that an effective monitoring system is required to inhabit the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders if corporate social responsibility performance becomes a medium to mitigate information asymmetry with external stakeholders. This study is significant in that it shows the relationship between corporate social responsibility performance and accounting performance from the viewpoint of agent theory. In particular, this study contributed to the previous studies, which failed to provide consistent results on the relationship between corporate social responsibility performance and corporate performance, by providing new evidence that this relationship can be determined by the intentions of controlling shareholders. This study has practical and policy implications as follows. First, as the instrumental stakeholder hypothesis, in order for corporate social responsibility activities to become a medium to mitigate information asymmetry among external stakeholders, internal monitoring mechanisms that can suppress opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders should be strengthened. We may consider strengthening the minimum appointment of outside directors on board or mandating the establishment of an audit committee that meets the best practices. Second, to make effective decision-making by stakeholders, it is necessary to introduce a disclosure system that can get information on both the corporate social responsibility activities and the trends of controlling shareholders’ holdings.