소유지배괴리도에 의한 배당성향이 이익조정에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]This study empirically examines the effect of control－ownership wedge interacted with cash dividend payout on earnings management. [Methodology]The wedge is the difference between control rights and cash flow rights (WED), and the discretionary accruals(DA), the proxies of earnings management, are estimated by the version of modified Jones Model(Dechow et al., 1995). Main independent variables are cash dividend payout(DIV), and lack of expected dividend(LD), dividend for the previous year(PD) are included as the interaction dummy variables. The test sample consists of 1,062 in KOSPI non－financial firms during 2001－2016. [Findings]The results are as follows: Firstly, the interaction terms, WED×DIV, are positively associated with DA. Secondly, the interaction terms, WED×DIV×LD, are positively associated with DA. Thirdly, the interaction terms, WED×DIV×PD, are positively associated with DA. [Policy Implications]These results show that in the high wedge firms managerial dividend policy is under the control power and managers do aggressive earnings management. Futhermore, the firms faced with lack of expected dividend and dividend history also make full use of earnings increasing management for the cash dividend. These findings can contribute to presenting the implication of earnings management for the dividend for the controlling owners expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders.