중국 상장기업의 소유구조와 이익조정 행태의 관련성

Extensive research has well documented the effect of corporate ownership structure on the quality of reported earnings. The ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is significantly changed in the late 1990s, but the percentage of state-owned and ownership-concentrated firms is still high compared to that of developed countries. In thus study, the relationship between corporate ownership structure and earnings management behavior in Chinese listed firms is investigated. Our analysis is based on the 9,051 firm-years data listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2016. Data are extracted from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database. Dependent variable, that is, the real earnings management (REM), was estimated using Roychowdhury (2006) model, and the accrual earnings management (AEM) was estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). To investigate the relationship between corporate ownership structure and earnings management behavior, we performed univariate mean difference and multivariate regression analysis. Results are summarized as follows; First, significant mean differences of REM between state-owned and non-state-owned firms and between high concentrated and low concentrated firms in ownership have been observed. However, these results are not maintained for AEM. Second, REM is positively associated with AEM, and it supports that the earnings management behavior in Chinese listed firms is generally complementary. This finding signifies that managers in China use REM and AEM as a complementary tool in their strategic earnings reporting. Finally, the complementary earnings management behavior is more significant in the state-owned firms and more distinct in high-concentration firms in terms of shareholders’ equity. Our findings suggest that Chinese listed firms jointly and simultaneously use REM and AEM to strategically report earnings. However, few studies have directly examined the complementary role between the two tools. This finding has implications for researchers and regulators. The complementary relationship suggests that earnings management activities may not fully explained if you focus on AEM. For regulators, this result implies that increasing scrutiny or greater disclosure over the discretionary behavior of REM and AEM is necessary.