실제영업활동을 통한 이익조정과 보유현금가치

This study examines the relationship between earnings management through real operational activities manipulation and the value of cash holding. The value of cash held by the firm depends on the level of agency costs and information asymmetry. In this case, managers are more likely to use cash for the private interest and make decisions that undermine the interests of shareholders. Investors evaluate the value of these companies' cash holdings low. If information asymmetry is so severe that external stakeholders are less likely to monitor the manager's behavior, managers are more likely to manage the earnings. In particular, real earnings management affects the cash flow directly by changing the business activities of the company, which leads to distortion of resource allocation and decreases enterprise value in the long run. Therefore, this study analyzes how investors perceive the cash holdings of the company when managing earnings through actual operational activities. As a result of the analysis, if the earnings is managed through actual business activities, the investors lower the reliability of the cash flow to the company 's cash holdings and evaluate the cash holdings as negative. In other words, in the market, investors perceive that the higher the earnings management level, the higher the information asymmetry problem and agent cost, the lower the investment efficiency, and the negative evaluation of the value of cash holdings. This study is expected to make additional contribution to existing research in field of the value of cash holdings and to provide useful implications for corporate managers, investors, financial authorities, and auditors.