온라인쇼핑몰을 위한 최적판매수수료체계

An online shopping mall usually applies the same seller fee schedule for a certain product group, which consists of the referral fee and the account fee. It surely affects the retail prices of the corresponding products. Since the online shopping mall as a retailer has its own retail pricing scheme which is different from that of suppliers who compete each other with their mutually replaceable products, it is unavoidable for each of the players to pursue different retail prices for the same product. To resolve such a conflict, we design their profit functions and propose an optimal referral fee schedule for each product group which maximizes the profit through the whole supply-chain under the assumption the online shopping mall is able to steer their retail pricing decision. Furthermore we prove it is necessary to apply a two-part tariff scheme to arrange their actual profits which depend on their bargaining powers between the online shopping mall and the suppliers with their account fee scheme. Also when the online shopping mall forms a certain group of products which is supposed to have the same seller fee schedule, it should apply the criterion of the similar marginal cost ratios rather than the similarity of products, which is quite different from its usual standard.