정보비대칭이 특수관계자에 대한 담보제공 및 채무보증에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

This study investigated whether the management of a company considers information asymmetry between management and stakeholders when providing collateral and debt guarantee for related parties. Specifically, this study empirically analyzed whether information asymmetry between management and stakeholders, measured by standard deviations of stock returns, affects collateral provision and debt guarantee for related parties. For this purpose, this study used data of 3,763 non-financial companies listed on the KOSPI securities market during 2011-2017 period. The empirical results of this study are as follows: First, information asymmetry between management and stakeholders has significant positive effects on collateral provision for related parties. As the information asymmetry between management and stakeholders increases, the amount of collateral provision for related parties tends to increase. This result implied that the company management pays attention to the information asymmetry between management and stakeholders when providing collateral for related parties. Second, debt guarantee for related parties were also shown to be consistently positively affected by all surrogate measures ​​for information asymmetry between management and stakeholders although there were little statistical significances. In other words, as information asymmetry between management and stakeholders increases, debt guarantee for related parties seem to also weakly increase. Third, in order to secure the robustness of the results of this study, additional analyses were conducted using only those companies having collateral provision or guarantee for related parties. The similar empirical results were obtained from these reduced samples. The results generally showed that the greater the information asymmetry between management and stakeholders, the greater the collateral provision and debt guarantee for related parties. Based on these analyses results, we can argue that the management, when making decisions about providing collateral and debt guarantee for related parties, generally takes into consideration the information asymmetry between management and stakeholders. Such collateral and debt guarantee for related parties, however, are virtually the company's risk of paying off the debt for the related parties involved instead. Consequently, stakeholders in the capital market need to carefully pay attention to the disclosed information of collateral provision and debt guarantee for related parties.