An Exploratory Study of the Emergent Model of Labor Regulation in Contemporary China

This paper aims to articulate the emergent labor regulation model in contemporary China. To accomplish this, I first review six popular accounts of enforcement and compliance in previous research, and then examine the relevance of these accounts to labor regulation in China. Although useful, existing approaches do not fit the Chinese context well, and thus cannot fully explain current labor law enforcement and compliance in China. Against this backdrop, in this paper, I propose a Chinese model of labor regulation, namely, the state-designed, bottom-up deterrence model, and describe its working mechanisms and unique features. I identify the following main features: first, the Chinese emerging model was thoroughly designed by the state, which established a floor for bottom-up pressure against complacent labor officials and unlawful employers; second, this emergent model is characterized by bottom-up pressure—the government strongly welcomes bottom-up “input” activities from individual workers and various societal actors as long as this input from bottom remains within state guidelines; and, third, this bottom-up model shares an element of deterrence theory in that the heightened risk and uncertainty that employers perceive are the main predictors of employers’ compliance, but it diverges from deterrence theory in that the source of enforcement is indirect intervention from the bottom, rather than direct state intervention. By articulating the emergent model in China, this paper can enrich current discussions of the varieties of labor regulations across the globe. In addition, it can help Korean firms in China better understand how labor regulation works and thereby enable them to take steps toward becoming more responsible in China.