특수관계자 거래가 주가붕괴 위험에 미치는 영향

A related party can influence the other party using governance structure and financial connection. Therefore, related party transactions are performed based on more arbitrary contract rather than competitive bidding. Therefore, there are high possibilities to take advantages through related party transactions for private gain or tax avoidance, resulting in a greater information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This increased information asymmetry may cause an inflated stock prices which is likely to burst in the future, resulting in a stock price crash. In this study, we investigate how related party transactions affect stock price crash risk and whether there are differences in the relationship depending on the corporate governance. We uses 7,099 firm-year observations listed on Korea Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2016. The empirical findings are as follows. First, the result show that stock price crash risk increases as credit offering for related parties increase. Secondly companies belonging to the business group show that inter-corporate loan, equity investment and credit offering for related parties have a significant impact on stock price crash risk. Third inter-corporate loan, equity investment for related parties have a significant effect on stock price crash risk only in group with high ownership control disparity. Overall, it is found that financial support and credit offering for related parties rather than asset and business transfer are factors that affect stock price crash risk. The results of this study are expected to suggest that regulatory measures and guidance should be provided to increase the level of disclosure of related party transactions in terms of capital market policies.