지주회사체계와 경영성과 : 형식적 변화인가, 실질적 변화인가?

Before the 1997 economic crisis, Chaebol under-performed compared to non-chaebol. Chaebol firms with higher ownership-control disparity or centrality were especially less profitable. Accordingly, as a policy to reform the Chaebol ownership structure, the Korean government allowed Chaebol to establish holding companies in 1999. About this, there were high expectations regarding the improvement of corporate governance. However, on the other side, there were also concerns that the concentration of controlling power in the hand of controlling family would grow excessively stronger. Since then, twenty years have passed, and a lot of Chaebol have transformed to the holding company system. This study examines the impact of the holding company system on performance using the sample of Chaebol firms traded on the Korean stock markets from 2001 to 2014. The findings are as follows. First, the holding company system is positively associated with profitability, ceteris paribus. Second, the association between the holding company system and profitability is strengthened by controlling shareholders' ownership, centrality, and foreign shareholders' ownership, ceteris paribus. The result implies that the holding company system performs better compared to the non-holding company system, partly because the corporate governance works better for improving performance in the holding company system. This paper contributes to the literature by helping us further understand the holding company system and by providing insights to regulators and practitioners.