중국에서 이사의 금전적 보수 및 소유지배구조가 재무제표 이익조정과 감사보수에 미치는 영향

Audit Fees are determined by audit risk born in the financial statements (Simunic 1980). We analyzed the role of audit risk in determining managements’ earnings manipulations in relation with directors’ compensation. This study analyzes A-companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets during 2015 through 2018. Results are summarized as follows: Management’s earnings manipulations are in positive relationship with audit fees, implying eanings manipulations causes audit risk perceived by external independent auditors. The effects of the interaction between directors’ compensation and earnings manipulations on audit fees are found negative. suggesting directors’ compensation enable directors to maintain Also, this study reports that the effects of the interaction between directors’ compensation and earnings manipulations on audit fees are negative for companies with less concentrated ownership structures. This finding suggests that ownership concentration may limit directors management of effective internal control system. Together, findings of this study are useful for those interested in building effective internal control system and designing directors’ compensation plans.