발전부문 경쟁의 효과성 분석: 발전자회사들의 수익률 및 지배구조

Korea's generation sector was separated from KEPCO in early 2000 and competition was introduced in the sector. However, the effectiveness of competition is controversial. This study analyzes the profitability of and governance over KEPCO's power generation subsidiaries to identify factors which limit the effectiveness of competition. The analysis shows that the profitability of subsidiaries is controled by government and is not results of market competition, which is because the wholesale electricity price is determined by the settlement adjustment coefficient under the principle of rate of return regulation. Further, the detailed rate of return regulation limits incentive to minimize cost of the subsidiaries. In addition, the government can directly control those subsidiaries in various ways, and in particular, the management evaluation by regulator controls quite specific management directions. This situation suggests that the generation sector is a structure that is difficult to produce the effect of competition, but it makes it difficult to develop cooperation and synergy among KEPCO and power generation subsidiaries. This analysis can contribute to the discussion for the future direction of the power generation sector by identifying the issues in power generation sector.