일감몰아주기와 비대칭적인 원가행태

[Purpose] Socially controversial favoritism in subcontracting has been issued. Giving the jobs to the controlling shareholder’s related parties is important tool to transfer wealth to the controlling shareholders. Since the regulation of favoring related contractors was enacted in the Inheritance Tax Gift Tax and Act was enacted in 2012, the number of affiliates and internal transactions of large corporate groups has been gradually decreased. This study examines the effects of favoring related contractors on the asymmetry of cost behavior. [Methodology] This study collects financial data through listed firms belong to the large corporate group from 2009 to 2017. This paper used the multi regression analysis, Anderson et al.(2003)’s model to test relationship between favoring related contractors and asymmetric cost behavior. [Findings] First, selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs show the anti－stickiness and costs of goods sold (COGS) and total costs (TC) present the cost stickiness when we adapt favoring related contractors act. This suggests that selling, general, and administrative expenses, which reflect the management’s discretion, are actively reduced due to the government’s restrictions on favoring related contractors, but the cost of goods sold and total cost reflect manufacturing activities become larger. Second, suspected firms that have received jobs exist more cost stickiness in all cost items than non－suspected firms. It means that suspected firms that have received jobs are more likely to respond to the tax－induced tax system by spending more aggressively than other companies to reduce after－tax operating income. [Implications] This study will be academically and practically meaningful in that it analyses the influences the favoritism in contracting through the cost behaviors. Also, it would be significant to verify empirically the relationship between favoritism in subcontracting and cost behavior in all industries.