Parent Control and IJV Performance in China : An Examination from Local Partner’s Managerial Perspective

While the majority of research on international joint ventures(IJVs) focused on the foreign parent’s perspective, this study examined the relationships between IJV control system and local parent goal achievement. Using a sample of 194 IJVs in China, we identified three types of parent control: strategic control, specific control, and social control, exercised by both foreign and local parent firms. Our findings showed that Chinese parent controls were positively associated with their own goal achievement, while the relationships between foreign parent control and Chinese parent goal achievement were mixed. In this study, parent control is divided into three types exercised by both foreign and local parent firms. And their relationships with local parent goal achievement are examined using a sample of IJVs in China. The findings of this study help depict the control system in IJVs and advance the understanding of the control-performance relationship. According to our study results, Chinese parent firms tend to benefit from their own control over IJVs, their perceptions of the performance implications of foreign parent control are relatively mixed. Consistent with transaction cost economics, our study confirms the importance of parent control. The positive relationships between Chinese parent control and goal achievement suggest that the exercise of strategic control, specific control and social control may have an impact on parent satisfaction. Parent firms may not only make IJV management to pursue parent firms’ requirements, but also benefit directly from involving into IJV activities. While strategic control directs IJV strategies towards a parent firm’ likeness, specific control enables the parent to protect its strategic assets and access complementary resources, and social control may change IJV culture in favor of the parent. This study may provide important implications for IJV practice in China.  On the one hand, the results support the importance of control to local parent firms. To achieve their own objectives, Chinese parent need to exercise strategic control, specific control, and social control. On the other hand, this study helps MNEs better understand their Chinese partners. An important implication is that greater foreign control does not necessarily lead to lower local parent satisfaction. They would prefer a moderate level of foreign parent specific control, given foreign parents’ need for knowledge protection. They may even welcome foreign parent social control. It is critical that MNE managers are aware of the implications of different control types as they try to impose control over the IJV.  Local parent satisfaction concerns not only the local partner but also the MNE partner. Unsatisfied local partners may create conflicts, withhold contribution, and eventually break up the partnership. Without achieving a minimum level of local parent satisfaction, the IJV would not be a success. Several limitations of this study should be acknowledged.  First, this study used cross-sectional data. Thus the direction of relationships cannot be clearly defined. The research results should be interpreted carefully. Second, the study sample was composed of relatively big IJVs with an average age of 10, which might be subject to selection biases. It is likely that the findings are more applicable to long-standing partnerships instead of relatively new ones. Third, for practical reasons, we were not able to collect data from multiple informants for all cases.