미국 법무부(DOJ) 반독점국의 자율준수프로그램(CP) 유인 제도 개선의 의의와 시사점

The previous DOJ’s Antitrust Division considered the ComplianceProgram(CP) to be a failed program if a company with pre-existing CPswas involved in a cartel. Therefore, the Antitrust Division refused to creditpre-existing compliance programs at the charging or sentencing phases ina criminal antitrust investigation. However, Starting in 2015, the AntitrustDivision began providing credit for compliance programs created during aninvestigation. In addition, on July 11, 2019, the Antitrust Division issued itsown ‘guidelines for Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs inCriminal Antitrust Investigations(effective CP evaluation guidelines)' topromote an active culture of self-compliance, such as corporateinvestigation cooperation and prevention of recurrence and to providetransparency and predictability of CP’s credit procedures. The Antitrust Division's new CP policies are expected to have asignificant impact on major competition authorities, including The KoreaFair Trade Commission. In particular, in response to strong sanctions ofinternational cartels, Our companies are expected to be required not onlyto actively utilize the Leniency Program but also to prove the CP’s effectiveness. Thus, the role of CP as a reason for the prevention ofcartels and corporate responsibility reduction is becoming increasinglyimportant. Thus, the analysis of the United States Sentencing Guidelinesand related cases that affected the Antitrust Division's effective CPevaluation guidelines could give implications for improvements in thecurrent CP incentive system and CP operations as a means of corporateresponse to strong sanctions of international cartels.