기업위험이 유상증자 방식에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구 : 주주배정을 중심으로

We examine whether managers’ decision of rights offering is motivated either by old shareholders’ wealth increasing incentive or by bad news hoarding incentive in the KRX KOSPI listed non-financial firms during 1998-2018 period. We clarify that firms with large total risk or firm-specific risk are not likely to choose rights offering in probability. Because dilution is lower in rights offering than in public offering or in third party allocation, the negative relations imply that SEO firms’ managers in Korea behave in the interest of old shareholders. Therefore old shareholders do not have to take more risk in rights offerings than in other types of SEOs. Agency problem between managers and outside shareholders does not seem to change the relation. The negative relations consistently hold regardless of the magnitude of either the largest shareholders’ ownership or foreign investors. It suggests that managers act in the interest of all old shareholders in general. However, agency problem between large shareholder and minority shareholders could change seems to affect managers’ incentive in Korea. The negative relation holds only in non-chaebol subgroup, whilst the significance of the relation disappears in chaebol subgroup.