비상장주식거래 플랫폼이 기업 가치와 기업지배구조에 미치는 영향

This study presents a theoretical model to analyze the effect of private equity trading platforms, which have recently experienced rapid growth, on the investment decisions of unlisted companies. As the value of unlisted companies has soared, demand for these stocks has increased. Accordingly, platforms for the brokerage of private stock transactions are being activated. We find that these platforms increase the liquidity in the unlisted stock market by easing regulations on trading of these stocks, further enhancing the firm values and corporate governance of the corresponding firms. In addition, a significant number of unlisted companies are family-owned, in which a manager is also a blockholder. Our study therefore constructs a framework based on a market microstructure model to analyze the impact of unlisted stock trading platforms. In the case of an unlisted firm, a potential dual agency problem exists where the manager, who is also a blockholder, invests less than the external shareholders’ profit-maximizing levels. We find that managers have the incentives to increase firms’ investment when the liquidity in the unlisted stock market improves with the growth of the private equity trading platform, implying that these platforms potentially enhance corporate governance of unlisted companies and promote their growth.