경영자보상, 경영권방어수단, 사회적 책임활동

The purpose of this study empirically examines the stakeholder theory is supported by corporate social responsibility activities and antitakeover provisions on executive compensation. More specifically, I want to analyze how social responsibility activities affect the executive compensation structure depending on antitakeover provisions. For the analysis, the sample firms collected 3,607 firm-year samples from companies listed on KOSPI market except for the financial industry from 2004 to 2015. I use a method of fixed effects panel model. The results are as follows. First, I find that corporate social responsibility activities is negatively associated with proportion of cash-based compensation, while it is positively associated with proportion of equity-based compensation. Second, antitakeover provisions is positively associated only with proportion of equity-based compensation. Third, In groups without antitakeover provisions, I find that corporate social responsibility activities is negatively associated with proportion of cash-based compensation, while it is positively associated with proportion of equity-based compensation. This can be interpreted as an effort to maximize the interests of stakeholders including shareholders, rather than an opportunistic act that maximizes executive compensation by performing social responsibility activities. Overll, my findings highlight the positive impact of corporate social activities on executive compensation mix implying that executive’s fiduciary behavior of engaging in corporate social activities leads to mitigating agency problems and maximizing firm value.