경영자의 과신성향에 따른 원가의 비대칭성과 통제구조

[Purpose] The purpose of this study is to examine whether the Cost asymmetry occurs in management over－confident enterprises, and to examine whether the system that can control or mediate these managers actually plays its role. [Methodology] The sample of this study is selected for KOSPI companies from 2014 to 2019 (an analysis period of five years) by selecting companies that meet each of the following conditions：The principal variable, over－confidence propensity of managers, was estimated by Ahmed and Duellman (2013)’s research methodology, using Anderson et al. (2003)’s methodology for asymmetry of cost. [Findings] First, Cost asymmetry was confirmed when the dependent variables were the total cost and the sales cost of the company with a tendency to overconfidence. Second, the Big Firm audit, a variable for controlling managers’ overconfidence, did not confirm the control effect when the dependent variables were total and sales costs. However, the big Firm audit played a significant role in the model in which the dependent variables were SGA. Third, in the case of the ratio of outside directors, the effect of control was confirmed when the dependent variables were total and sales costs, but if the dependent variables were sales and administrative expenses, it was confirmed that they were not controlled. [Implications] It can be said that the empirical analysis of the system that can mediate the overconfidence tendency of managers support the research that the overconfidence tendency of existing researchers has affected Cost asymmetry. Through this study, it was confirmed that there is a system that can reasonably mediate and control decisions of managers.