이익조정과 조건부 보수주의가 정보비대칭에 미치는 효과

[Purpose] This study analyzes the effect of managers’ earnings management and accounting conservatism on information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors. [Methodology] In this study, 11,462 firm－year observations of non－financial listed companies from 2010 to 2018 are collected. The bid－ask spread and the daily stock yield volatility are used as proxy variables for information asymmetry. As a major independent variable, the proxy values of earnings management is estimated by discretionary accruals measured in the modified Jones model and the Jones－ROA model, and the proxy value of conditional conservatism is measured by C－Score proposed in Khan and Watts. [Findings] The current increase in earnings management leads to an increase in information asymmetries in the following year, while the current increase in conservatism leads to a reduction in information asymmetries in the following year. Conditional conservatism significantly reduces the effect of earnings management on information asymmetry in the group where conditional conservatism is strengthened, compared with the group where conditional conservatism is weaken. [Implications] This study investigates the effect of changes in earnings management and conditional conservatism on future information asymmetry and shed light on the economic role of conservatism that reduces information asymmetry and improves transparency of accounting information by mitigating incentives for management’s earnings management and managers’ reporting tendency.