지배주주의 소유-지배 괴리가 IPO 성과에 미치는 영향

Following agency theory, this research examines the effects of the ownership-control disparity of controlling shareholders in Initial Public Offering (IPO) companies. While previous studies in this area have generally reported a negative relationship between the ownership-control disparity of controlling shareholders and firm performance in publicly traded companies, relatively few studies have focused on the effects of ownership-control disparity of controlling shareholders in Korean IPO market. This paper also investigates how corporate governance mechanisms such as venture capital ownership, existence of outside directors, and external auditors, moderate the relationship between ownership-control disparity and IPO performance. To this end, hypotheses were developed and tested with a sample of 226 newly listed companies on the KOSDAQ market from 2011 to 2016. Our results show that (1) ownership-control disparity of controlling shareholders significantly decreases IPO performance, and (2) this negative relationship is mitigated as venture capital ownership and abnormal audit fees for external auditors before listing increase. Based on these results, theoretical contributions and practical implications of the study are discussed.