唐 創業 직후세대의 제너럴십(Generalship)像으로 본 ‘중세 귀족사회’의 일단 ― 행태, 평가, 史述에의 정착 과정을 중심으로 ―

The so-called ‘Medieval(Middle Age) Aristocracy Theory’ has been evolved into somewhat complicated analytic framework, which places the concept of ‘Colonial Empire’ in its core argument. It has been pictured essentially, as the Regnum of Capital-centered aristocrats who had established themselves by building up complex and hierarchical human network. But it is doubtful that whether this kind of projectional concept of history could actually be applied for understanding political aspects of Early Tang Era, especially in and around Military affairs. No aristocratic generalship had relied solely on Political Capital which was based upon human network, and no non-aristocratic generalship had participated in a recognition struggle of the day solely with merits and performance. By comparing the demand for ‘Fielded as a proper general, Appointed as a proper minister’ generalship and the actuality of the figures evaluated, one can find it rather bluntly even on the contents of seemingly benign Official Histories. A member of notable He-dong Wen-xi Pai clan, Pai Xing-jian, had to establish the authority which would enable him to lead and command the field army for campaigns, by compromises and proofs of talent. Had he not invented and exaggerated the narreme that Su Ding-fang, the very renowned general by 670s who had literally annihilated 3 polities over decades, had passed all operational-tactical senses and skills down to him, none in both court and army would accepted such a sudden appointment of someone without any former military records. Like Li Jing, the most symbolic ‘Proper general-Proper minister’ generalship, he had managed to be successful by acquiring ‘very much likely’ testimonies from the era, and matching those narremes with his own ‘miraculous’ skillful deeds-performance. This was the major departure from both, failure of Xue Ren-gui, who had been lacking the coercive authority, and folly of Li Jing-xuan, who had been lacking actual skills-abilities. Yet, the registered-recognized personal performance and merits, which are naturally supposed to serve for bearers’ own interest in a competitive society, could be effective as political-social capital only if they were connected to common, shared benefits. The Liu Gens suffered double, even triple demerits, which had been stemmed from ‘sins of the fathers’. ‘The Elder’ De-wei had been a subordinate of contender to the throne, Li Mi, and once surrendered himself to yet another warlord, Liu Wu-zhou. ‘The Younger’ Shen-li was partially responsible for one of the most decisive defeats Tang Dynasty had been through, in Qing-hai campaign. But, being placed as resonant backgrounds for marriage with Royal bloodlines and forged image of ‘Family Concordia’, their records could actually reinforce the narremes of extraordinary fillial affection – both Shen-li and Shen-li’s son had walked barefoot, bleeding all through their respective father’s funeral procession – , and staunch resistance to rebels and ‘Harsh Prosecutors’. In that way, even their failures could actually be utilized as resources of their Gens. Conversely, there were some families which could be assured of position in society and collective honor, by personal distinguished deeds of arms which were seen while serving for the security of all. Ming-zhen – Wu-ting familia (Cheng) - who once held dubious loyalty to Tang dynasty as a locally based petit-warlord - and Wang Fang-yi - who had been ostricized by the maternal grandmother from Royal house and much more dangerously, was actually an elder cousin of expelled empress - could make good examples of them. Strenuous, continuous efforts and struggles of these gens-familias and persons are clearly in contrast with the utter failure of Li Jing-xuan, who had been so preoccupied with building up ‘human network’ - through overlapping marriage connections with high-tier gentes and raising stakes in personnel affairs by his own official function - that eventually ended up with crossfire from lots of political adversaries, yet never had taken the campaign-leading post seriously, responsibly at all. With that folly, he could not assert any kind of contribution toward public interests. The Imperial authority, which could be given with narremes ‘touched by his (Emperor’s) own hands’, was one of the strongest and most effective resources competitive figures could make use of. It was also an ingredient to be appreciated very much importantly when contemporaries are evaluating soldier-generalship, because of a presumable peculiarity of military career, which clearly prefers extraordinary exploits to steady service records. Xue Ren-gui, who was in the rank and file of ‘Volunteer called upon’ at the starting point of career, could make a typical example of this. After the initial ‘Imperial’ citation of personal bravery & combat skill in Koguryo Campaign, he could develop and promote himself as an able officer with tactical sense & commanding abilities. On the contrary, Wang Fang-yi, who already had borne enough ‘Aristrocratic backgrounds’, could secure his records and performance – which apparently capital elites had never appreciated before – only by personal recognition and ‘human touch’ from Emperor Gaozong. If registered performance and merit had been guaranteed by Emperors’ distilled memories, then it could even work as a token for political-social bargain, like in the case of Xiao Si-ye, whose death penalty for defeat was commuted to exile. Even if the actual contents of ‘Imperial human touch’ was quite adverse, still it could be counter-utilized, as Cheng Ming-zhen transformed the scornful anecdote - which initially states that he had been mumbling facing Taizong’s inquiries – into complimentary ending, by Trollope’s ploy. His son, Cheng Wu-ting, in spite of having many records proving disloyalty and opportunism in hindsight – being interposed in a tension between Pai Yan-Pai Xing-jian, active participation in dethronement of Emperor Zhongzong, etc. - , could settle narremes favorable to him, such as exultant reaction from Turks to his sudden, early demise. This could be done only with the personal recognition of his performance on the northen frontier by Empress Wu Ze-tian. Being relatively unknown both to contemporaries and modern scholars, Yan Qian-fu - the only existing written material mentioning whose name is his own epitaph - had actually served in Pai’s Eastern Turk campaign, and furthered career in posts of prefect and field army sub-commander. What barred him from being compiled into the Official Histories were, not only a lack of any merits or deeds which could become established as narreme, but also, more importantly, a lack of this ‘Imperial Touch’ in his whole life. His family had managed to call a human hub figure, Pai Xing-jian, in the epitaph, but certainly it was not enough to fill in the gap. This stark distinction reveals the political-social reality that, ethnic-ancestral (genetic) nobility, aristocratic establishment, being noble and benevolent itself by merits, are totally different matters from each other, and neither of them could be achieved or enjoyed merely by holding its components.