기술창업기업의 투자유치에 대한 정부지원의 신호효과: 허들모형을 이용한 실증연구

There often is information asymmetry between start-ups and the investors, which is because start-up companies in the early stages do not have track records. Meanwhile, since the government grants programs go through a fair and the intense competition process, the government grants can provide a more objective information for start-ups in the early stages and perform a signal function that guarantees a company's capabilities and potential. This study confirms the quantitative relationship between government grants and investment attraction by using the hurdler model. We found that, although there is the proportionate relationship between the scale of government grants and that of external funds, more than a certain amount of government grants is required for technology-based start-ups to exceed the stage of attracting their first external funds. Our findings suggest that it is necessary to consider the hurdles structure in the study of signaling theory perspective, as the mechanisms for determining whether or not to attract external funds are different from determining the level of external funds. In addition, differentiated policy support is needed to help early-stage technology start-ups go beyond the threshold of investment attraction―the creation of a ‘threshold effect'.